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HOMOSEXUALS' RIGHT TO MARRY:
A CONSTITUTIONAL TEST AND
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
American history furnishes numerous examples of individual
and minority struggles to secure the "Blessings of Liberty." The
success of these endeavors frequently depends upon society's pre-
vailing mores and attitudes toward those seeking what they deem
their fundamental rights. The courts often become the ultimate
arbiters of these disputes, and they too are undoubtedly influenced
by the majority's current prejudices. One such dispute has cen-
tered on marriage between homosexuals."
The question of the constitutionality of state prohibitions of
same-sex marriage first reached the courts in the early 1970s. Homo-
sexual couples were repeatedly denied the opportunity enjoyed by
heterosexuals to legitimate their relationships and obtain marital
benefits.2 This Comment will explore the inadequacy of the ju-
diciary's response to the issue of same-sex marriage by comparing the
courts' reaction to this problem with decisions involving similar
constitutional considerations. Using an equal protection analysis,
the Comment argues that homosexual couples involved in exclusive,
long-term relationships are similarly situated to committed hetero-
sexual couples and that a "middle level" of judicial scrutiny should
be applied to classifications based on sexual preference. Examina-
tion of marriage restrictions leads to the conclusion that they are
unconstitutional: the states must afford homosexuals the oppor-
tunity to make a marriage commitment. Finally, quasi-marital
status is proposed as a mechanism for fulfilling the state's duty to
provide marital benefits and legal status to homosexual couples.
I. Tr CASE LAw 3
Regulation of marriage has traditionally been the province of
state governments rather than the federal judiciary.4 Although
1The term "homosexual," unless otherwise specified, will be used in this
Comment to refer to both men and women.
2 jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v.
Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
3 For a comprehensive review of recent decisions affecting homosexuals' pro-
fessional and social status, see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HAsIwns L.J. 799 (1979).
4 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Cleveland v. United States, 146 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir.
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most state statutes do not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage,5
state courts have interpreted them to preclude the possibility of a
valid homosexual marriage. All courts faced with this issue have
relied on the premise that a lawful marriage, by definition, can be
entered into only by two persons of opposite sex.6 No court has
taken the position that state prohibition of homosexual marriage
is unconstitutional.
Cases involving same-sex marriages have been litigated in two
contexts-dissolution of same-sex unions and denial of marriage
licenses to homosexual couples. Illustrative of the first category
are "marriages" between two parties of the same sex, one of whom
misrepresented his gender. In Anonymous v. Anonymous,7 for
example, the Supreme Court of Queens County, New York, held
that a marriage between two males was a nullity, notwithstanding
the husband's belief that the wife was a female at the time of the
ceremony and her subsequent operation to have her male organs
removed. The court reasoned that although New York law8 has
no provision regarding same-sex marriage the traditional definition
of marriage as a union between man and woman is implicit in the
statute. The ceremony in which plaintiff and defendant partici-
pated therefore did not create a marriage contract "in fact or in
law." 9 Such reliance on conventional notions of marriage typifies
the reasoning of courts confronted with previously solemnized
homosexual unions.1 0
1945), aff'd, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123
(10th Cir. 1944); Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd
mem., 416 U.S. 953 (1974); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565, 568 n.6 (E.D.
N.Y. 1973).
5 The Texas statute is unusual in providing that, "[a] license may not be issued
for the marriage of persons of the same sex." TExAs FAm. CoDE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.01
(Vernon 1975).
6 See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); M.T.
v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076
(1976); B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Singer v.
Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
7 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
s N.Y. DoM. EL. LAw §§ 5-25 (McKinney 1977).
9 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 985, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501
(Sup. Ct. 1971). Interestingly, the court rested its decision upon the New York
statute's silence regarding same-sex marriages, although it could have relied on the
wording of the statute itself. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 7 (McKinney 1977) provides
that a marriage in which consent has been obtained by "reason of force, duress
or fraud" is "void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction" (emphasis supplied).
10 M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 84-85, 355 A.2d 204, 207-08, cert. denied,
71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976) (while holding that male undergoing successful
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The second category of same-sex marriage cases involves judi-
cial confirmation of a state's refusal to issue a marriage license to
homosexual couple. In Baker v. Nelson," the Minnesota Supreme
Court became the first state supreme court called upon to legitimate
a same-sex marriage. The court first dismissed the petitioners'
contention that the absence of an express prohibition in the state
statutes 12 evinced a legislative intent to permit homosexual mar-
riages. As in Anonymous v. Anonymous, 3 the court relied on the
traditional definition of marriage as a contract between a man and
a woman.' 4 The court also denied that the petitioners were de-
prived of a fundamental right or subjected to irrational or invidious
discrimination and thus disposed of the argument that state recogni-
tion of homosexual marriage is constitutionally compelled. 15
The outcome of Baker was followed in Singer v. Hara 16 and
Jones v. Hallahan,' cases also involving homosexual couples seeking
marriage licenses.' 8 In Jones, the Kentucky Court of Appeals de-
nied a license to a lesbian couple. Relying exclusively on the
traditional definition of marriage, 19 the court refused to consider
the petitioners' constitutional arguments.
transsexual operation is thereafter considered female for marital purposes, court
notes in dictum that statute impliedly requires that marriage partners be members
of opposite sex); B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(transsexual husband may not counterclaim for divorce in annulment suit because
valid marriage could not be contracted between woman and partner lacking male sex
organs).
1291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
1 2 MWX. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-.08 (West 1969). MIfN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01
(West Supp. 1978) now defines marriage as a contract between a man and a
woman.
13 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
14Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
15 Id. at 313-15, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87. The holding in Baker governed the
Eighth Circuit's decision when the same couple brought suit to obtain increased
educational benefits from the Veterans Administration on the ground that they were
married. Plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of marriage
vel non. McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976).
1611 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
17 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
' 8 Another such case, Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
was disposed of on a procedural issue before the court reached the substantive
question.
19 Because the Kentucky statutes did not define marriage, the court turned to
common usage and quoted several dictionary definitions, which designated marriage
as a relationship between one man and one woman. 581 S.W.2d 588, 588
(Ky. 1973).
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The Singer court, after disposing of a claim that the statute
allowed same-sex marriage,20 discussed extensively the equal pro-
tection issue, as well as the impact of Washington's equal rights
amendment.21 The court held that restriction of marriage to
heterosexual couples was not a gender-based classification demanding
close judicial scrutiny.22 A low level of scrutiny was applied, and the
traditional view of marriage justified as bearing a rational relation-
ship to the policy of "affording a favorable environment for the
growth of children." 23 Nor did plaintiffs prevail on the theory
that they were deprived of a fundamental right, the right of mar-
riage. Marriage, held the court, refers to a male-female union.
Therefore, "[a]ppellants were not denied a marriage license because
of their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage license because
of the nature of marriage itself." 24
The judiciary has unanimously inferred prohibitions of same-
sex marriage from silent state statutes. The state courts have failed
entirely to question their assumption that the concept of marriage
on which they rely so heavily is constitutionally acceptable. The
perceived incompatibility of marriage and homosexuality arises out
of outmoded biases, which should not be allowed to justify denial
of the legal, financial, and social benefits of marital status. The
following section is an attempt to rebut these attitudes by detail-
ing the similarities between heterosexual and homosexual relation-
ships.
20 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West Supp. 1979) provides: "Marriage
is a civil contract which may be entered into by persons of the age of eighteen
years, who are otherwise capable . . ." (emphasis supplied). Petitioners argued
that the legislature, by designating "persons of the age of eighteen years" rather
than "males and females," intended to permit same-sex marriages. The court
rejected this argument, pointing to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.210 (West
Supp. 1979). That section, which relates to the affidavits required for issuance of a
marriage license, refers to "the male" and "the female," thereby refuting the sug-
gestion that the legislature intended to allow same-sex marriages. 11 Wash. App.
247, 249-50, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974).
2
1 WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1. The court held that Washington's equal rights
amendment neither prohibits all legal differentiation between males and females
nor creates any new rights or responsibilities, such as the right of persons of the
same sex to marry. 11 Wash. App. 247, 258-60, 522 P.2d 1187, 1194-95 (1974).
For a discussion of the potential effect of a federal equal rights amendment on the
recognition of homosexual marriage, see Note, The Legality of Homosexual
Marriage, 82 YATE L.J. 573 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Legality of Homosexual
Marriage].
22 Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 258-59, 522 P.2d 1187, 1194-95 (1974).
23 ld. at 264, 522 P.2d at 1197.
24 Id. at 261, 522 P.2d at 1196.
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II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AS A BASIS FOR
HOMOSEXUALS' RIGHT TO MARRY
A. Comparing Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples
The gay community in America is more couple-oriented than
many heterosexuals realize. Pervasive homosexual involvement in
exclusive relationships 25 undermines the popular notion that homo-
sexuals are usually promiscuous.26 Moreover, a great deal of evi-
dence suggests that intense homosexual relationships are often long-
lasting.2
7
The ingredients of a successful homosexual relationship are
virtually identical to those of a comparable heterosexual relation-
ship.28 Both are characterized by the partners' long-term affection
for each other and by their abilities to compromise and deal with
25 See P. FsnER, TnE GAY MYsTQUE 210-12 (2d ed. 1975); C. WAEmuE,
IDn=rY AND CoM~mTv IN Tm GAY WoRLD 71 (1974); George, Marriage
Counseling for Gay Couples, 2 NE w GAY LiFE, Feb. 1978, at 23.
20 Those homosexuals who do frequently change sex partners often view their
own promiscuity as "a hopefully temporary transitional stage in which they more or
less systematically search for the 'right' partner with whom they can have a lasting
relationship." C. Tmpr, TnE HoMosExUAL MATwX 145 (1975).
Another recent study found that, although some homosexuals frequently change
sex partners,
a relatively steady relationship with a love partner is a very meaningful
event in the life of a homosexual man or woman . . . . The fact that
they generally went on to a subsequent affair with another partner seems to
suggest a parallel with heterosexuals' remarriage after divorce rather than
any particular emotional immaturity or maladjustment.
A. BELL & M. WEiNBERG, HoMosxA.XLmns: A STUDY OF DrxMSTY AmONG MEN
AN WOMMN 102 (1978).
27 See Hooker, The Homosexual Community, in THE SAME SEx 37 (R. Weltge
ed. 1969).
The results of a study of the lesbian community in Philadelphia between 1964
and 1970 manifest a high rate of long-term alliances; among the lesbians surveyed,
64 of 65 indicated a preference for such relationships, 75% had had two or fewer
such relationships, and 71% had had one such arrangement. Hedblom, The Female
Homosexual: Social and Attitudinal Dimensions, in THE HoMosExuAL DiraceTc
48-49 (J. McCaffrey ed. 1972).
28 In one signal respect, of course, same-sex unions differ from heterosexual
marriage: no homosexual couple has the capacity for procreation. Discussion of this
distinction appears in the text accompanying notes 126-29 infra, where protection
of marriage as a reproductive unit is treated as a state interest asserted in support
of marriage restrictions. The difference in reproductive capability is not germane to
comparison of homo- and heterosexual marriages because courts have not regarded
the ability to reproduce as part of the definition of marriage. In M.T. v. J.T., 140
N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976),
for example, the court upheld a marriage solemnized after the wife's successful
sex-reassignment operation, despite the fact that transsexuals are sterile. See
generally Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosexual Chal-
lenge, 5 ANGLo-Am. L. Rav. 41 (1976).
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conflicts as they arise.2 9 According to Dr. C. A. Tripp, a prominent
psychologist and student of homosexuality,
homosexual and heterosexual bonds share a host of com-
monalities. . . . In particular, the settled-in qualities of
the homosexual couple tend to be precisely those which
characterize the stable heterosexual relationship. The
similarities evidenced in daily life are especially notice-
able. The way the partners interact as they engage in con-
versation, the way casual affection is expressed and minor
irritations are dealt with, as well as how visitors are treated,
or dinner is served, and myriad other details of everyday
life are all more or less indistinguishable. Viewed from
this angle, there are clearly more differences between in-
dividuals and individual couples than there are between
kinds of couples.30
Moreover, the commitment many homosexuals have made to their
mates is of a magnitude comparable to the bond between husband
and wife. A successful long-term homosexual relationship may be
even stronger than that of a heterosexual couple: while society
smiles upon heterosexual marriage, a successful homosexual couple
maintains unity in the face of society's disapproval. 31
The studies cited above indicate that the emotional component
of a successful long-term homosexual relationship is essentially the
same as that of a successful long-term heterosexual relationship.
Yet the states persists in a traditional view of marriage that grants
legitimacy to heterosexual couples while withholding it from homo-
sexuals. Significant disabilities result from homosexuals' incapacity
to legitimate their unions. They are deprived of all federal and
state marital privileges: joint tax returns 32 and dependency deduc-
tions; 3 gift and estate tax benefits; 84 wrongful-death recovery; 35
2 9 See George, supra note 25, at 23.
30 C. TRIPP, supra note 26, at 159.
31 For example, homosexuals who decide to live together face more hurdles
than a heterosexual couple. Realtors may be reluctant to rent, families may dis-
courage the alliance, neighbors may be hostile or unfriendly, and for some homo-
sexuals the fear of discovery at work is overwhelming. See P. FISHER, supra note
25, at 212; George, supra note 25, at 23.
S2I.R.C. § 6013(a). Because marital status is defined under state and not
federal law, the Internal Revenue Service must, as a rule, accept the state's definition
of marriage. E.g., Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
33 Id. § 213. For a discussion of homosexual couples' problems under the
Internal Revenue Code, see The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 21,
at 579 n.28 (1973).
S4 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2513, 2523.
85 E.g., 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance benefits,3
granted on the basis of an existing or previous marriage; 37 intestate
inheritance; 38 community property rights; 39 state-enforced support
obligations; 40 and other benefits.41 More fundamentally, same-sex
couples are denied the additional sense of worth that comes with
acceptance by the community.42
Because of the similarity between heterosexual and homosexual
couples, the distinctions presently drawn between the two must be
examined to see if they can withstand equal protection analysis.
The remainder of this section considers equal protection juris-
prudence as it applies to the issue of homosexual marriage. The
most familiar doctrines appear to support state prohibitions of
homosexual marriage. In the last few years, however, the Supreme
Court has begun to move away from the rigidities of the old doc-
trines. This development offers some hope for equality of marital
opportunity.
B. The Appropriate Degree of Judicial Scrutiny
The Supreme Court began to use the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment as a major interventionist tool during
the 1960s. At that time it developed a "two-tiered" approach,
which revolutionized fourteenth amendment challenges to legisla-
tive enactments. 43 If the legislation in question denigrated a
3642 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976).
87 See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (surviving parent, regardless of gender, entitled to insurance
benefits).
3
8 E.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
3 9 E.g., CAL. PRnO. CODE §§ 201-206 (West 1956 & Supp. 1979).
40 E.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. §§44:1-143 (West Supp. 1979) (enforceable support
obligation of husband).
41 In McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976), for example, the court
affirmed the dismissal of a homosexual's complaint, which sought an increase in
Veterans Administration educational benefits on the ground that he had a "dependent
spouse.
42 Withholding the right to marry has been a mechanism of oppression in other
sectors of our society. In the antebellum South, slaves were not permitted to
marry. K. STAMPp, THE PEcuLAu INsTrrnIoN 198 (1956). This prohibition was
more than an economic measure: it was a means of denigrating the "inferior" race.
Consider the 1836 statement of Chief Justice Ruffin of the North Carolina Supreme
Court, quoted in 1 H. T. CATRALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AmmwcAN
Sr&vRY AND THE NEGRO 77 (2d ed. 1968): slave marriage "can mean only that
concubinage . . . with which alone, perhaps, their condition is compatible."
4 3 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HAuv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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"suspect class" 44-a disadvantaged group deemed to need special
judicial protection-or had a significantly adverse impact on "funda-
mental" rights,45 the Court subjected that legislation to a "strict
scrutiny" test. In order to pass this test, a state had to show that
the enactment in question was narrowly drawn to meet a compelling
state interest.48 If, on the other hand, neither a suspect class nor a
fundamental right was involved, the Court would uphold legislation
that was rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate state
interest.47 In practice, strict scrutiny virtually assured a finding of
unconstitutionality. 48 Attempts have been made to invoke strict
scrutiny in the context of homosexual marriage,49 but without suc-
cess: Homosexuals have not been accorded suspect-class status nor
has homosexual marriage been deemed a fundamental right.
1. Homosexual Marriage Is Not a Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized marriage as a funda-
mental right in its recent decision in Zablocki v. Redhail.50 As a
result, strict scrutiny is now required whenever a legislative classifi-
cation substantially infringes the right to marry.51
Redhail is probably not a useful precedent for the declaration
of homosexual marriage as a fundamental right. In the first place,
the Court clearly cautioned against sweeping applications of its
holding:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right
to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regnla-
4 4 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens are suspect
class); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classifications
suspect).
4aE.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right of access to court
for divorce); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to
vote).
46 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
4 7 E.g., McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (failure to pro-
vide for absentee voting by unsentenced inmates); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (regulation of eye examinations); Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (restriction on methods for pumping gas and
mineral water).
4 8 See Gunther, supra note 43, at 8.
49 See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 542 P.2d 1187 (1974).
50 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Wis. STAT. § 245.10 (1973) provided that Wisconsin
residents having court-ordered support responsibilities for issue not in their custody
could not marry without judicial permission. The Court invalidated this statute
because it was not "closely tailored to effectuate" the state interests involved. 434
U.S. at 388.
51 See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (minor burden on marriage does
not invoke strict scrutiny).
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tion which relates in any way to the incidents of or pre-
requisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.
5 2
Secondly, Redhail's designation of marriage as a fundamental
right referred to the situation of a heterosexual couple: Homosex-
uals' fundamental right to marry does not automatically follow from
the decision. The Supreme Court's determination was grounded
on three distinct rationales: (1) the right to bear a child is a mockery
without a concomitant right to marry and bear legitimate chil-
dren; 53 (2) the right to marry is part of the fundamental right of
privacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause; 5
and (3) "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men." 15
The first rationale is clearly inapplicable to homosexual couples.
Although the second rationale is a relevant consideration, the
utility of the privacy argument is limited by the Court's reluctance
to extend the right of privacy to sexual preference.56  Until the
52 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
53 Id.
4Id. 384.
55d. 383 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
U The Supreme Court has declined to consider the argument that state sodomy
statutes intrude upon homosexuals' personal choice protected by the right to privacy.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (upholding sodomy statute); Enslin v. Wallford, 565 F.2d
156 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 912 (1978) (upholding sodomy statute
as applied to homosexuals). The refusal to extend the right of privacy to sexual
preference and activity forms a stark contrast to the long line of cases that protect
decisions regarding child-rearing, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), abor-
tion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and contraception, Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The district court in Common-
wealth's Attorney distinguished these cases on the ground that they concerned
marital relations and family life. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975). Yet
Eisenstadt, upholding the single person's right to obtain contraceptives, had re-
jected the marital/nonmarital dichotomy. Surely, the initial choice of bedmate is
as intimate as the decision to avoid contraception.
A few courts have arrived at interpretations of the privacy cases at odds with
that of the Commonwealth's Attorney court. See Shuman v. City of Philadelphia,
470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("a party's private sexual activities are
within the 'zone of privacy' protected from unwarranted government intrusion");
State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (striking down antifornica-
tion statute as violation of privacy right). The majority, however, continues to
deny protection to nonmarital, consensual sexual activity. See Richards, Sexual
Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A" Case-Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, .30 HAsflNGs L.J. 957 (1979); Rivera, supra
note 3, at 952-55.
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judiciary protects this choice, it is doubtful that the privacy argu-
ment can support the more radical view that a homosexual couple
has a right to marry.
Only the third rationale might justify characterizing homo-
sexual marriage as a fundamental right. Nevertheless, the theory
that the right to marry is essential to the pursuit of happiness will
probably not be applied to homosexuals in view of the conventional
notion of marriage as a contract between a man and a woman."
Given the pervasiveness of that traditional definition, along with the
circumscribed holding of Redhail and the Supreme Court's refusal
to approve sexual autonomy for homosexuals, same-sex marriage
cannot realistically be regarded as a fundamental right.
2. Homosexuality Is Not a Suspect Classification
The state's police power allows classification of citizens for
various purposes, as long as those legislative classifications are
"reasonably justified in pursuit of a legitimate interest." 58 State
courts generally allow the legislatures a great deal of latitude in
establishing these classifications, but a state is always restricted by
both the Supreme Court's and the governing state court's designa-
tions of suspect classes. Thus far, only race,59 alienage,00 and na-
tional ancestry "- have been deemed suspect classifications.
Recent cases involving discrimination based on gender and
illegitimacy have enumerated the bases on which a classification will
be declared suspect. Five criteria appear to be of controlling im-
portance. The class in question must (1) have suffered a long
history of discrimination; 62 (2) possess a characteristic that bears no
relation to ability "to perform or contribute to society"; 68 (3) be
marked by a "badge" of distinction; 64 (4) be relegated to a position
57 See notes 4-24 supra & accompanying text.
58 Note, The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A
Constitutional Challenge That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN Dirco L. Rav.
799, 821 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Lesbian Mother].
59 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1946).
00 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
61Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
62 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
63Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Acanfora v. Board of
Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 853 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 485
P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971).
4Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 414
U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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of political powerlessness; 65 and (5) possess an immutable char-
acteristic that is either inherent or uncontrollable.6 Although homo-
sexuals do not satisfy the criteria to the same degree as those groups
declared suspect, they nevertheless possess certain suspect character-
istics.
Homosexuals undoubtedly have a long history of discrimina-
tion, dating back to Biblical days.6 7 Many courts still sanction such
discrimination, especially when the homosexual activity in ques-
tion is of a blatant and unrestrained nature.68
Society's attitude toward homosexuality reflects the irrational
impulses motivating most discrimination. There is little evidence
that homosexuality is related to the capacity to be a productive mem-
ber of society. To the contrary, the few studies in this area have
found an overall similarity between heterosexuals' and homosexuals'
psychic adjustment and job performance. 9 Some federal agencies
have begun tentative reevaluations of discriminatory practices di-
rected at homosexuals." The numerous departments that retain
discriminatory requirements often explain them on the ground that
1S San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Hob-
son v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968).
66 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
' 7 "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it is abomination."
Leviticus 18:22. See Genesis 19:5; Leviticus 20:13; Romans 1:26-27; Barrett,
Legal Homophbia and the Christian Church, 30 HAsrmncs L.J. 1019 (1979),
Chaitin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LiNcoLN L. REv. 24 (1973).
68See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972) (court allowed University of Minnesota to reject avowed
homosexual's application for position as librarian); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359
F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (district court held that homosexual teacher's
dismissal was justified in view of his extremely controversial behavior, but that
homosexuality alone would not normally be a proper basis for discharge; circuit
court found public statements protected by the first amendment).
69 See A. BELL & M. Wxmnmue, supra note 26 (social adjustment among homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals similar, although authors found some evidence that female
homosexuals changed jobs more frequently than their heterosexual counterparts);
A. SToRP, SEXUAL DEVIATION 34 (1964) (sense of inferiority due to deviancy
encourages "striving for excellence"). Cf. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (dismissal improper because plaintiff's homosexuality did not affect job
performance); Aumiller v. University of DeL, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977)
(plaintiff's statements on subject of homosexuality did not impede performance of
his daily duties).
70The Immigration and Naturalization Service recently issued a temporary
directive reversing its long-standing practice of denying admission to foreign visitors
suspected of homosexuality. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, at A-14, col 1. Addi-
tionally, the Civil Service Commission has adopted a new personnel policy that
significantly restricts the use of homosexuality as an employment criterion. See
Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated,
429 U.S. 1034 (1977) (remanded for reconsideration in light of new employment
guidelines); Aumiller v. University of Del. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
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homosexual employees give the department a bad name.71 Thus,
discrimination is justified by the existence of prejudice, rather than
by job-related distinctions.
Arguably, the discrimination faced by homosexuals has not
been as pervasive and burdensome as that afflicting other groups,
because homosexuality is not a veritable "badge" of distinction.
7 2
Homosexuals who choose to hide their sexual preference can usually
avoid discrimination. This lack of visibility is one of the most im-
portant distinctions between homosexuals and other groups declared
suspect. Nevertheless, those homosexuals who do not wish to live
a "closet' existence risk subjecting themselves to professional and
social ostracism as soon as they reveal their sexual preferences.
Moreover, the obviousness of a distinguishing characteristic is a
questionable requirement for designation of suspect classes. As
Justice Stevens has noted, a classification based on a personal trait,
though "not as apparent to the observer as sex or race," is not "any
less odious." 73
The issue of homosexuals' political powerlessness is somewhat
complex. Undoubtedly, the gay rights movement is gaining
strength in certain parts of the country, and its increasing mo-
mentum will likely mobilize the homosexual vote.7 4 Additionally,
many closet homosexuals have occupied positions of political im-
portance in the past; 75 in areas with large gay populations, avowed
homosexuals are beginning to run for public office,76 and some have
even been victorious in city elections.
77
Despite these indications of progress, homosexuals are still rela-
tively powerless as a political group. Many homosexuals still fear
a negative reception in the political arena, and the sizable number
of individuals and groups who harbor antagonistic feelings toward
71 See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist., 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (school teacher's ability to teach impaired by
public displays of homosexuality which society regards as immoral). For an exten-
sive discussion of the dubious rationales for discharging homosexuals, see Rivera,
supra note 3, at 805-74.
72 See note 64 supra.
73 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 523 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 In the past, local politics has been the main focus of gay activism, with city
and state governments as the major targets. The movement is presently developing
a more national perspective and directing a larger part of its efforts toward the
federal government. The homosexual vote in the immediate future will probably
be most influential in urban politics. See P. FismER, supra note 25, at 190, 194.
75 C. TmPP, supra note 26, at 201.
76 See P. FisHER, supra note 25, at 194.
77 For example, avowed homosexual Harvey Milk was elected to the San
Francisco City Council. He served as city supervisor until his assassination in 1978.
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homosexuality suggests that these apprehensions are realistic. 78 Al-
though Seattle,79 San Francisco,80 and Berkeley 8 - have passed or-
dinances banning discrimination against homosexuals, the gay rights
movement recently suffered political setbacks in New York City 82
and Miami.88  In Wichita, Kansas,84 and Eugene, Oregon,8s voters
actually repealed antidiscrimination ordinances. Although their
political future appears more promising than ever before, 6 homo-
sexuals have a long way to go before they can be assured of protect-
ing themselves through the political process.
The immutability requirement presents the greatest obstacle
to homosexuals' claim to suspect-class status. Although the origin
of homosexuality has not been conclusively determined, most ex-
perts support a conditioning theory which, while acknowledging
that embryonic factors may be predisposing, emphasizes environ-
mental influences.87 If homosexuality is not an unalterable accident
78The virulence of anti-gay sentiment can be judged by Proposition Six (the
Briggs Initiative), presented to the California electorate in November, 1978. This
provision would have required the state and all of its school districts to conduct
investigations of any school teacher who, in public or private, advocated or prac-
ticed homosexuality. Proposition Six met defeat at the polls. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,
1978, at 19, col. 3. See also Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27
Aim L. REv. 687, 702 (1973).
79A nondiscrimination ordinance was passed in Seattle. 1974 FACTS ON Frm
459, col. 3.
80 N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1978, at 15, col. 1.
811 d., Oct. 12, 1978, at 55.
82 The 1978 New York City Council resolution to prohibit discrimination in
hiring and housing on the basis of sexual preference was defeated by a vote of
6-3. Id., Nov. 9, 1978, at B3, col. 6.
83 Miami voters refused to reenact the Dade County nondiscrimination ordi-
nance that was repealed in 1976 during the Anita Bryant campaign. Id., June 8,
1977, at Al, col. 4.
84 Id., May 10, 1978, at A18, col. 1.
85Id., May 24, 1978, at A18, col. 3.
86 The most recent promise comes from a bill, which has passed the Connecticut
state senate, banning job and housing discrimination against homosexuals. Id.,
Apr. 5, 1979, at B3, col. 1.
87The 1948 Kinsey report still commands majority support:
The data indicate that the factors leading to homosexual behavior are
1) the basic physiological capacity of every mammal to respond to any
sufficient stimulus; 2) the accident which leads an individual into his or
her first sexual experience with a person of the same sex; 3) the condi-
tioning effects of such experience; and 4) the indirect but powerful con-
ditioning which the opinions of other persons and the social codes may
have on an individual's decision to accept or reject this type of sexual
contact.
A. K NsEY, W. PoNmRoY, C. MATrN, & P. GERnARD, SExuAL BsAvxon I3 THE
HuMNr FEmALE 447 (1953). See Money, Pubertal Hormones and Homosexuality,
Bisexuality, and Heterosexuality in NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TAsK
FORCE ON HOMosExuArry, FNAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPFaS 77 (1972);
The Lesbian Mother, supra note 58, at 814, 825; Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359
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of birth, then homosexuals do not possess an inherent immutable
characteristic.
The judiciary will also regard as immutable an uncontrollable
characteristic."" The extent to which homosexuality can be con-
trolled, however, is not clear. Many researchers adhere to the theory
that once sexual orientation is established, change is almost impos-
sible.8 9 Nevertheless, several recent studies show that even indi-
viduals who have been predominantly or exclusively homosexual
for more than five years can change their sexual orientation if they
are highly motivated to do so.90 In light of these studies, homosexu-
ality cannot be regarded as a condition that is always beyond the in-
dividual's control. Thus, for purposes of determining whether
homosexuality is a suspect classification, it appears that sexual pref-
erence cannot be viewed as immutable. The question is, however,
very close.
Although homosexuals have long been subject to discrimination,
are still politically weak, and possess a characteristic that bears no
relation to their social productivity, homosexuality is not as visible
or as immutable as the characteristics of the traditional suspect
classes: race, alienage, and national ancestry. This analysis justifies
the judiciary's reluctance to designate homosexuals a suspect class.91
In view of this conclusion and the determination that homosexual
marriage is not a fundamental right, legislation that operates to the
detriment of homosexuals does not warrant the application of strict
scrutiny.
F. Supp. 843, 849 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974).
88 See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
89 Many studies have indicated that the possibility of changing homosexuals to
heterosexuals is at best marginal. NATIONAL INsTrruT OF MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL
REPORT OF TE TAsK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 5 (1969). See also CoamrrrEE
oN HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PRosTrrTUnoN, REPORT 26, 66 (1957); A. KAsusuN,
SmruArrry AND HOMOSFXUALITY 572-606 (1971); C. TrPP, WHO Is A HOMO-
SEXUAL? 11 (1965).
9o See Pomeroy, Homosexuality, in THE SAmvE SEx, supra note 27, at 7-9;
W. MAsTERs and V. JOHNSON, HomosExuArayry IN PERSPECTVE 401-02 (1979) (in
treatments aimed at changing homosexual orientation, authors experienced 65%
success rate, attributed, in part, to careful screening for highly motivated subjects).
91 To date, only one federal district court has suggested that homosexuals are a
suspect class. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd,
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). That court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), in which four Justices declared women a suspect class. Id. 688.
Although the Acanfora court noted that the suspect status of gender classifications
need not imply that "sexual preference" is similarly suspect, the court recommended
such an extension of the plurality opinion in Frontiero. Acanfora, 359 F. Supp.
at 852.
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3. The "Heightened Rationality" Test for Discrimination
Against Homosexuals
Although strict scrutiny may not be invoked on behalf of homo-
sexuals, it need not follow that legislative classifications based on
sexual preference must be judged by the old "mere rationality"
standard.92  Recent Supreme Court decisions have articulated an
intermediate level of scrutiny, which may be termed the "heightened
rationality test." 93 This "more modest interventionism" 9- has
been applied to a variety of statutory schemes in place of the lower-
level rational basis standard. 95
One formulation of the middle-tier test is applied to gender-
based classes. Such classifications "must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." 91 On the other hand, middle-level scrutiny,
when applied to discrimination against illegitimates, requires that
the legislative classification be "substantially related to permissible
state interests." 97 This "means-oriented inquiry" is attractive be-
cause it permits courts to protect individual rights and yet provides a
narrow standard which avoids "court confrontations with broader
value choices." 98 Middle-level scrutiny thus seeks to cope with the
problem "that there remain rights, not now classified as 'funda-
mental,' that remain vital to the flourishing of a free society, and
classes, not now classified as 'suspect,' that are unfairly burdened by
invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their
members." 99
02 See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
93Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (char-
acterizing level of scrutiny as "middle-tier"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(locus classicus of middle-level test). See Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the
"Heightened Rationality Test": Is the Supreme Court Promoting a Double Standard
in Sex Discrimination Cases?, 32 WAsH. & LEE L. BEv. 275 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as "Heightened Rationality"].
94 Gunther, supra note 43, at 21.
95 See "Heightened Rationality," supra note 93, at 278.
96Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (test applied to gender-based
classification) (emphasis added). See Gunther, supra note 43, at 47.
97Lalli v. LaMl, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (emphasis added). See Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
98 Gunther, supra note 43, at 24.
99 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (urging application of middle-level scrutiny to old-age
classifications).
The "heightened rationality" test has also been applied by many lower federal
courts. E.g., Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978); Moss v.
Secretary of HEW, 408 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Samuel v. University of
Pitt., 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 991
1979]
208 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The classifications tested by middle-level scrutiny are, like
gender'010 and illegitimacy,1 1 based on immutable personal char-
acteristics that, in general, lack a substantial relationship to articu-
lated, legislative purposes. 1 2  Thus, the intermediate level of
(3d Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H.), aff'd
as modified, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854
(D.R.L 1973).
100 Occasionally the Court upholds a gender-based classification on the ground
that it has a fair and substantial relation to the legislative purpose. E.g., Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508-09 (1975) (upholding federal statute that allowed
male and female naval officers to remain in the service for different amounts of time
before being discharged for want of promotion); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (upholding Florida statute that granted widows but not widowers $500.00
annual property tax exemption).
More typically, however, gender-based distinctions have been invalidated. E.g.,
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (federal statute unconstitutional because
it conditioned survivors' benefits for widowers, but not widows, on proof of receipt
of at least one-half of their support from deceased spouses); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer
to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidating Utah child support statute that provided that
the period of minority extends to age 21 for males, to age 18 for females);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (federal statute unconstitutional
because it denied insurance benefits to surviving widowers with children in their
care while authorizing such benefits for similarly-situated widows); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating federal statutes that, solely for
administrative convenience, designated spouses of male members of the uniformed
services as dependents eligible for benefits, but required spouses of female members
to prove dependency for over one-half of their support); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (invalidating Idaho Probate Code provision that gave preference to men
over women for appointment as administrators of decedents' estates). See Note,
Constitutional Law--Gender Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause-the
New Standard, 42 Mo. L. Rv. 470 (1977).
1OE.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding New York intestacy
statute that allows inheritance by illegitimate issue only when paternity order has
issued during father's lifetime); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (in-
validating Illinois statute that discriminated against illegitimate children); Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding section of Social Security Act that
distinguished between unacknowledged illegitimate children and all others).
For an example of middle-level scrutiny masquerading as "mere rationality,"
see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971) (citing test articulated in Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), court invalidated Massachusetts statute that "irrationally"
accorded different treatment to married and unmarried individuals).
Although some Justices have argued that gender and illegitimacy should be
suspect classes, the majority have been content to apply a level of scrutiny with
more bite than the rational-basis test. For example, in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495 (1976), the Court conceded that illegitimacy is an immutable characteristic that
bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in society, but refused to
designate illegitimacy a suspect class. The Court reasoned that illegitimacy is not
an obvious badge of distinction and that "the discrimination against illegitimates has
never approached the severity" of the discrimination against other groups. Id. 506.
Similarly, although a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), declared sex a suspect class, the majority has never endorsed application
of strict scrutiny to gender-based distinctions.
102 One commentator has suggested that any classification based on personal
characteristics or status should be subject to the intermediate level of scrutiny.
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guar-
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scrutiny is appropriate for classes that come close to meeting the
traditional indicia of 
suspectness.
Homosexuals stand in need of the judicial protection offered
by the "heightened rationality" test and very nearly meet the re-
quirements of the suspect class.103 Sexual preference, like gender
and illegitimacy, is a characteristic that does not impair an indi-
vidual's ability to contribute to society. Like women and illegiti-
mates, homosexuals have been and, in some regions, continue to be
subject to de jure discrimination and violent prejudice.1e4 Homo-
sexuals, like women, have just begun to gather together as a
political force.105 Although homosexuality is not as obvious as
gender,10  this distinction should not prevent homosexuals from re-
ceiving the benefit of middle-level scrutiny. The comparison with
illegitimates is telling-neither characteristic need be known until
revealed by the individual or an investigation.
In one respect, homosexuals differ from women and illegitimate
offspring. New research indicates some possibility of changing
sexual orientation if the patient is highly motivated. 0 7 The statis-
tics reported in most studies, however, are not promising.108 Even
the Masters and Johnson researchers, working with carefully selected
and highly motivated subjects, failed to bring about the desired
change in over a third of their patients.10 9 Only those homosexuals
who are wealthy and eager enough to obtain the best treatment can
hope to alter their sexual preference.
Judicial solicitude for homosexuals should not be withheld
because the characteristic is mutable in a few: middle-level scrutiny
should be applied to legislative classifications based on sexual pref-
erence."
0
antee--Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 CEo. L.J. 1071, 1082
(1974).
'0 3 See notes 67-90 supra & accompanying text.
104 See notes 78-86 supra & accompanying text.
105 See notes 74-77 supra & accompanying text.
' 0 6 See notes 72-73 supra & accompanying text.
'0 7 See notes 87-90 supra & accompanying text
'0 SSee NATIONAL INsTTuE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 89 (twenty
percent chance of achieving some heterosexual interest in sufficiently motivated
patients); J. Frank, Treatment of Homosexuals in NATiONAL IlsTrruTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOmosEx-Arry: FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS
67 (1972) (ten to twenty percent chance of change for motivated patients).
109 W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 401-02.
110 In Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 262-63 n.13, 522 P.2d 1187, 1198
n.13 (1974), the court recognized that recent Supreme Court equal protection
decisions utilize an intermediate level of scrutiny, but refused the petitioners' request
to apply this standard of review.
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C. State Interests Behind the Ban on Homosexual Marriage
The "heightened rationality" analysis examines whether classi-
fications can be justified by legitimate state interests. Before apply-
ing this test to the denial of homosexuals' right to marry, the nature
of the harm visited upon homosexual couples by such a prohibition
should be re-emphasized. Homosexual couples who have made long-
term commitments to their mates, though similarly situated to
committed heterosexual couples,"' are deprived of tax, property,
social security, and other financial benefits conferred upon married
heterosexuals. 12  Moreover, prohibiting homosexual marriage
denies same-sex pairs the opportunity afforded heterosexual couples
to reap the psychological benefits of marriage.
State prohibition of homosexual marriage will survive the
"heightened rationality" test only if it is shown to be substantially
related to a permissible state interest." 3  Prohibiting homosexual
marriage has frequently been justified by several perceived needs:
(1) to foster a "cure" for and prevent an increase of homosexuality;
(2) to support state sodomy laws; and (8) to ensure family stability
and procreation. 1 4  For each of these objectives, either the state
interest itself is not legitimate or the relationship between that
interest and prohibition of homosexual marriage is too attenuated
to validate the classification.
M11 See notes 25-31 supra & accompanying text.
112 See notes 32-41 supra & accompanying text.
113 This Comment chooses, for analytic purposes, the less stringent version of
the "heightened rationality" test and therefore requires only a "permissible" state
interest rather than an "important" one. See notes 96-97 supra & accompanying
text.
In illegitimacy cases, the Supreme Court has restricted the defendant state to
arguments based upon objectives actually contemplated by the legislature that passed
the challenged statute. E.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 508 n.14 (1976).
See Gunther, supra note 43, at 46 (The judiciary must "assess the rationality of
the means in terms of the state's purposes rather than hypothesizing conceivable
justifications on its own initiative.") (emphasis in original).
Legislation grounded upon stereotypes or "'archaic and overbroad' generaliza-
tions" will not pass muster. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977)
(quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)). See Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
Most state marriage statutes do not mention homosexuality. A legislative
intent to exclude them is inferred by reviewing courts on the basis of "traditional"
notions of marriage. The courts also supply justifications for restriction of the
right to marry. See notes 4-24 supra & accompanying text. Although these
judicially advanced state interests are arguably irrelevant, this Comment will accept
the state courts' idea of state interests because they represent an authoritative local
source.
114 See Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62
CA.. L. REv. 1169, 1243 (1974); The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note
21, at 580-82.
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A justification for state prohibition of homosexual mar-
riage that focuses on "curing" homosexuality is untenable. Homo-
sexuality is no longer viewed as a "disease" requiring a "cure." 115
The conclusions of the Kinsey investigators were largely responsible
for reconsideration of the nature of homosexuality as "a natural
variation of sexual expression," rather than a pathological condi-
tion.1 6  Official support for this view came from the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service in August, 1979, when he an-
nounced that "current and generally accepted canons of medical
practice with respect to homosexuality" indicate that it should "no
longer be considered a mental disease or defect" for purposes of the
immigration laws."'
Assuming that the state might legitimately wish to discourage
a practice that is not a disease, there is little or no reason to believe
that withholding marital status will lessen the incidence of homo-
sexuality. Many psychologists report that sexual preference is de-
termined in early childhood,":8 long before the influence of legal
codes and norms reaches the consciousness. Even if homosexuality
is regarded as an individual choice, the experience of countries that
have adopted liberal moral codes indicates that legalizing homo-
sexuality has no discernible effect on the number of homosexuals
in the population. 119 The goal of "curing" or discouraging homo-
sexuality, therefore, is not substantially furthered by prohibiting
same-sex marriage.
The argument that prohibition of homosexual marriage sup-
ports sodomy laws is irrelevant to the twenty-three states that have
repealed these statutes. 20 Although other states may still cite their
sodomy laws as support for restrictions on marriage, the validity and
wisdom of applying sodomy laws to consensual homosexual behavior
115 In December, 1973, the American Psychiatric Association voted to remove
homosexuality from its official list of mental disorders. Press Release of American
Psychiatric Association, Resolution on Homosexuality (Dec. 15, 1973). See also
A. BELa. & M. WEINBERG, supra note 26, at 196-97.
116 A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note 26, at 196.
"17 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1979, at 20, col 1.
118 Chaitin & Lefcourt, supra note 67, at 38; Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359
F. Supp. 843, 847-48 (D. Md. 1973), aft'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974) (expert testimony that sexuality is determined by age five
or six).
19 See The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 21, at 581 n.39
(collecting authorities).
120 According to the National Gay Task Force in New York City, 23 states had
repealed their sodomy laws as of August, 1979: Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
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are questionable.121  Some lower federal courts have deemed these
laws to be of slight importance because they are so rarely enforced
and because substantial intrusion on individual privacy would
result from greater enforcement efforts. 1 22  When sodomy laws are
invoked, it is usually in a capricious fashion, creating a dispropor-
tionate harm to those arrested and prosecuted. 123
The foregoing considerations call into question the constitu-
tionality of prosecuting homosexuals under state sodomy laws. In
fact, unfairness in the administration of sodomy statutes, combined
with the long line of cases protecting the physical autonomy of
heterosexuals, 12 4 compels the conclusion that state restrictions on
private, consensual sexual activity are unconstitutional, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's refusal to hear argument on the
issue.125 Sodomy statutes thus cannot provide the justification for
prohibition of homosexual marriage.
Although the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the
family unit,1 26 prohibiting homosexual marriage does not further
that interest. Research 127 and the experience of other countries 128
show that homosexuals compose a relatively small and stable per-
centage of the population. Consequently, the theory that permitting
homosexual marriage would significantly threaten human reproduc-
tion is highly questionable. Moreover, the view that marriage "exists
as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values
associated with the propagation of the human race" 129 is gradually
losing its foothold in our society. An increasing number of hetero-
sexual couples are choosing to marry, but declining to raise families.
121 The Model Penal Code proposed by the American Law Institute recom-
mends that only sexual practices involving force, minors, or public acts be subject
to criminal punishment. MODEL PEAu.L CODE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955). Additionally, in 1969 the National Institute of Mental Health urged that
all private sexual acts between consenting adults be legalized. See The Lesbian
Mother, supra note 58, at 814.
122See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 852 (D. Md., 1973),
aff'd without reaching constitutional issue, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
123 See The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 21, at 581 n.42.
124 See note 56 supra.
125 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See note 56 supra.
12 6 See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
1
27 An estimated four percent of the adult, white male population of the
United States is exclusively homosexual. A. KINSEY, W. PomnoY & C. MARTDn,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR L-T THE Hum.N MALE 650-51 (1948). See also Acanfora v.
Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 849 (D. Md. 1973), af'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); C. TawP, supra note 26; The Legality
of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 21, at 581 & n.39.
128 See note 119 supra & accompanying text.
129 Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 259, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1974).
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In sum, prohibition of homosexual marriage is not an effective
means of advancing any legitimate state interest. Homosexual
couples should therefore be afforded the opportunity to obtain
the legal status and marital benefits to which they are entitled.
V. QUASI-MARITAL STATUS: A MEANS OF AFFORDING
HOMOSEXUALS MARITAL BENEFITS AND LEGAL STATUS
A. The Mechanics
Judicial recognition that current marriage restrictions violate
the equal protection clause does not end the inquiry; the problem
of effecting a remedy remains. In the belief that the solution should
emanate from state authorities rather than federal courts, this Com-
ment offers a legislative proposal to equalize the situations of homo-
and heterosexual couples.
An enactment offering homosexuals quasi-marital status would
make available the marital benefits and legal status that same-sex
couples are presently denied.130 The only legal difference between
marriage and quasi-marital status is that the former would continue
to be a heterosexual institution, whereas the latter would create an
option exclusively for homosexual couples.
The legal unions of homosexual couples would be solemnized
in the same way as are heterosexual marriages. The duly licensed
homosexual couple could go to a justice of the peace, who would be
authorized by statute to perform these ceremonies, or to an appropri-
ate minister. Divorce proceedings for homosexuals would also be
handled in the same fashion as heterosexual divorces. Courts would
have to become involved in adjudicating homosexual dissolution
proceedings in order to protect the financially weaker partner.
Through quasi-marital status, homosexuals could obtain the
financial benefits-provided for example, by tax, social welfare, and
intestacy laws-now afforded married, heterosexual couples.' 3 ' Sim-
ilarly, the option of quasi-marital status would enable same-sex
couples to reap the psychological benefits of a legally sanctioned
relationship. 32 Quasi-marriage thus recognizes that homosexuals
have the same emotional needs as heterosexuals. In this respect,
the proposal comports with the widely held view of homosexuality
130 Quasi-marital status was first proposed in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATz, ThE
FA~mm AND THE LAw 9 n.1 (1965). See also The Legality of Homosexual Mar-
riage, supra note 21, at 588-89. The details of the plan offered here, however, are
original.
131 See notes 32-41 supra & accompanying text.
132 See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
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as an alternative form of sexual expression, rather than a path-
ological condition.
33
B. Adoption Under the Quasi-Marital Status Proposal
The proposal for quasi-marital status raises the obvious issue
of adoption privileges. Under the intermediate level of scrutiny,
state prohibition of homosexual marriage cannot be justified be-
cause it does not sufficiently support legitimate state concerns. 134
Middle-tier analysis of adoption restrictions based on sexual pref-
erence yields a different conclusion. This section demonstrates that
the "heightened rationality" test does not compel unconditional
adoption privileges for homosexual couples and outlines the appro-
priate treatment of adoption under the quasi-marital status proposal.
The best interest of the child is the overriding concern when
courts make custody decisions. 135 Moreover, the state does have
a legitimate interest in safeguarding children.136  Equal protection
analysis under the "heightened rationality" test will therefore tol-
erate limitations on the adoption privileges of homosexual couples
if such restriction aids significantly in protecting the best interests
of candidates for adoption.
The strong anti-homosexual feelings harbored by many Ameri-
cans will not disappear overnight, even if homosexuals are afforded
quasi-marital status. All too often children adopt their parents'
irrational prejudices. 37 Children growing up in homosexual en-
13 3 See notes 115-17 supra & accompanying text.
134 See notes 113-29 supra & accompanying text.
135 State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Farn.
Ct 1973); Rickard v. Rickard, 7 Wash. App. 907, 503 P.2d 763 (1973); 1 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. §502 (Purdon Supp. 1964-78) (issuance of adoption decree
requires finding that "the welfare of the person proposed to be adopted will be
promoted by such adoption").
Some courts have declared that a homosexual relationship creates an improper
environment for a child, In re Jane B, 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup.
Ct. 1976), while other courts have awarded custody to homosexuals with the stipu-
lation that they confine their contacts with their lovers to delineated circumstances.
Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 240665 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Cal, June 8,
1972); see The Lesbian Mother, supra note 58, at 816. Only a few courts have
maintained that the existence of a homosexual relationship does not automatically
render a home unfit for children. People v. Brown, 49 Mich. App. 358, 212
N.W.2d 55 (1973); M.P. v. S.P., No. A-989-77 (Super. Ct., N.J., July 23, 1979);
Hall v. Hall, No. 55900 (C.P., Locking County, Ohio, June, 1974); Isaacson v.
Isaacson, No. D-36867 (Super. Ct., King County, Wash., Sep. 3, 1974); Schuster
v. Schuster, No. D-36868 (Super. Ct, King County, Wash., Sep. 3, 1974).
136 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
137 Although there appear to be no studies on the prevalence of such ridicule,
psychologists agree that children mirror their parents' attitudes. C. ALLPORT, Tim
NATURE OF PREjuDicE 276-81 (2d ed. 1958).
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vironments frequently incur a great deal of ridicule from their
peers. A legislature may legitimately find that, absent a biological
relationship to one member of the homosexual union, children
ordinarily should not suffer such needless emotional trauma. To
balance the interests of children and those of quasi-married couples,
the state might adopt a presumption against adoption by homosex-
uals, but allow an individual couple to rebut the presumption by
showing that they can raise the child in a tolerant community.
138
In addition, adoption should always be permitted when the
child is mature enough to decide rationally that he wishes to live
with the homosexual couple seeking to adopt. Designating an age
of reason and maturity is problematic because children of the same
age differ in understanding. Yet many states have statutory provi-
sions or common law rules allowing children of a certain age to
contribute to decisions regarding placement or custody.1 9 Similar
provisions could be enacted for cases of homosexual adoption. Or-
phanages and adoption agencies would usually make the final de-
termination of adoptive parents' suitability. 40 A homosexual
couple should, however, have recourse to the courts to ensure equit-
able treatment.
CONCLUSION
Would the quasi-marital status proposal satisfy the gay com-
munity? The answer probably depends upon the individual and
his or her primary reason for wishing to marry. Those homosexuals
seeking the financial benefits and legal status of marriage should
138 This proposal resembles current treatment of biracial adoption. Agencies
and experts question the wisdom of depriving a child of racial identity by placing
him with parents of a different race. Henry, Whites Find Black-Baby Adoption
Harder, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1979, at B3, col. 4. Equal protection considerations,
however, have caused courts to reject statutes that make race the determinative
factor in adoption proceedings. Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.
La. 1972); In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
Instead, racial considerations are regarded as relevant, but not controlling. In deal-
ing with the similar problem of custody when the mother's second husband was of
a different race, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to deny her claim unless
specific danger of severe prejudice was shown. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v.
Kreisher, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973).
Giving homosexuals an opportunity to adopt cannot be denied on the ground
that the children's sexual preference will be dictated by that of their adoptive
parents. A recent study indicates that youngsters being raised by lesbian mothers
and their lovers "appear to be traveling the normal path of boy-girl heterosexual-
ity." Lesbian Offspring Called Normal, Newark Star-Ledger, Apr. 2, 1978, at 52.
See notes 118-19 supra & accompanying text.
'39 E.g., Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §§3107.06(E), 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1978)
(age twelve). A one-year trial period before entry of the final adoption decree
might provide additional protection for the child.
14o E.g., id. § 3107.06(C).
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be pleased with quasi-marital status. Other homosexual couples
interested in adoption might find the special regulations offensive.
The proposed scheme is not a panacea. In addition to varied public
responses, many potential administrative problems are sure to arise.
Nevertheless, creativity and experimentation are necessary to re-
solve the conflict between constitutional imperatives and deep-
rooted American prejudices. A feasible and equitable resolution
could take the form of a legislative enactment that would afford
homosexual couples the same financial benefits and legal status as
married heterosexual couples.
